DDG 1000

Nice summary of the willfully obfuscated situation with DDG-1000 by War Bots: How U.S. Military Robots Are Transforming War in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Future author David Axe.

Behind the Navy’s Stealth Destroyer Shuffle | Danger Room from Wired.com
Meanwhile, the company that makes the DDG-1000’s radar says that the Navy is wrong. The new destroyer can use air-defense missiles after a few, relatively cheap modifications, Raytheon claims. The company is lobbying hard to keep the ship class alive. Despite this, the DDG-1000 program is unlikely to extend beyond the three vessels. That third ship was the Navy’s consolation prize to Congress and the defense industry.

Follow?

Well, that was quick!

Looking at the future force scenarios, let’s say there are three of these guys in commission. One in refit, one in the Atlantic/AFRICOM, one in the Pacific or Indian Ocean.

Navy reverses course, to seek third stealth destroyer | HamptonRoads.com | PilotOnline.com
PORTLAND, Maine (AP) _ The Navy has changed course and decided to push for construction of a third DDG-1000 destroyer that would be built at Bath Iron Works, Sen. Susan Collins said Monday.

What’s the new classified threat that the DDG-1000 can’t beat?

Navy: No Need to Add DDG 1000s After All - Defense News
Top Navy acquisition officials dramatically reversed course during a congressional hearing July 31, saying the service needed to purchase more Arleigh Burke-class DDG 51 destroyers, and no longer needs the next-generation destroyer it has been pushing for over the past 13 years.

This, after years of vigorously claiming the service needed to move beyond the 1980s technology in the Burkes and leap ahead with the new ship, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class. Now, they’re saying the Zumwalts just won’t cut it, citing the planned ship’s inability to fire advanced versions of the Standard Missile, contradicting previous industry claims.

They also said there was a new “classified threat” for which the Burkes are better suited but would not go into specifics.

in carrier warfare is to man the perimeter of the carrier battle group and absorb heavy losses. While it may not be true that you can never have enough surface combatants, 84 is only 7.5 escorts per 11 carrier groups. An aditional 25 combatants, or ten escorts per carrier, would be a good thing. Maybe at 12 or 15 escorts per carrier they start getting in each other’s way.

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Collins and Senate colleagues had added $2.6 billion to the 2008 defense bill for the third DDG-1000, which was to have been built by her constituents at Bath Iron Works. She is now advocating for the construction of nine more DDG-51s at BIW, in order to maintain the shipyard’s employment level and turnover. This is apparently more important than any military need for the DDG-51s, which is not discussed in Collins’ release.

It is now time to revisit future Navy fleet requirements: here’s a link to some recommended reading from Bob Work at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who has suggested ways of defining a new surface combatant

That was quick. Can anyone say “Sea Wolf”?

Cost and design bugs could sink new destroyer program | HamptonRoads.com | PilotOnline.com

But limiting the DDG 1000 series to two ships also may raise questions about the Navy’s fiscal management.

Retired Vice Adm. Tim LaFleur, who served as the Navy’s top surface warfare officer from 2001 to 2005, said the DDG 1000’s distinctive design and operating systems will require the service to maintain special supply lines and training programs for sailors for decades. Such expenses routinely are spread across a long line of ships but are harder to justify when just two are involved, he said.

Because of those costs, the Navy probably would offer few objections if Congress decided to cancel the DDG 1000 program completely, Work said.

This might be a good subject for a nimble book. Anyone “want to write one?